Nos últimos anos se observa uma crescente instrumentalização do ensino, que pode ser percebida na busca desenfreada dos professores por novos métodos e técnicas de ensino, produzidos pelo mercado editorial ou instituídos pelas políticas oficiais. Pode ser observada também na matriz curricular dos cursos de formação de professores que, pelo menos no Brasil, privilegia o técnico em detrimento das disciplinas relacionadas às Ciências Humanas e à Filosofia. Tentando contribuir para a reflexão acerca dessas questões este artigo se propõe a discutir possibilidades de conceber a educação como uma arte e compreender a poética como uma das dimensões do ensino, contrapondo-se à tendência de cientifização da educação e de instrumentalização do ensino observada no presente. Particularmente, este artigo interroga o lugar ou não-lugar da filosofia e do filosofar nessa arte da educação e nessa poética do ensino, tendo em vista a forma como ela é concebida no e pelo pensamento filosófico contemporâneo. E, com isso, saber quais seriam os principais problemas e temas dessa filosofia e desse filosofar, e como poderiam ser oferecidos não apenas um conjunto de questões para refletir, como também abrir algumas perspectivas para que os educadores possam enfrentar os desafios dessa atividade, reconhecendo os seus limites e as suas possibilidades atuais. Escolheu-se recobrar neste artigo, para tanto, o pensamento dos frankfurtianos e, particularmente, o de Adorno. Mesmo que haja divergências entre o pensamento de Adorno e o de Lyotard – a começar por não terem vivido em um mesmo contexto histórico–, ele elucidará algumas afinidades sobre o tema em foco, isto é, sobre as possibilidades da educação ser concebida como arte e da constituição de uma poética no ensino, vislumbrando a postulação de ambos por uma política da resistência por intermédio dessa atividade.

Nonostante tutti i tentativi recenti di riscattarla e di metterla nuovamente al centro dell’attenzione politica e accademica, l’infanzia continua a situarsi al margine delle preoccupazioni “serie” del mondo adulto. É un fatto che non ha bisogno, mi sembra, di prove ulteriori rispetto a quelle che quotidianamente si traggono dalla lettura delle pagine economiche e politiche dei nostri giornali. É tuttavia necessario rinunciare ad una lectio universale di questa assenza, che pretenda di generalizzare sistematicamente e in tutti i campi questa esclusione del mondo dei bambini. É all’interno della tradizione della cultura occidentale, della quale la filosofia, quella con la ‘F’ maiuscola, é allo stesso tempo promotrice e prodotto, che possiamo tentar di comprendere l’ampiezza del problema. E anche in questo caso va ricordata l’assenza continua dei bambini dai testi classici della filosofia occidentale. Anche se non assenza della pedagogia, nel seno della ricerca di tekhnai educative che permettevano di “inquadrare” l’infanzia in una società o in un’altra, l’assenza dei bambini é più che altro esclusione dal protagonismo, dalla centralità del suo mondo specifico, dalla rilevanza epistemologica di questo modo di vita in relazione alla “veritá” come tale. Ma anche un’affermazione come quella appena accennata, rischia di riprodurre acriticamente slogan politico-pedagogici poco utili. Senza negare tale assenza e le sua gravi conseguenze per società ancora troppo “adultiste”, quello che si vuol fare é cercare, in una “discesa libera” nella storia del pensiero occidentale, segnali di “altre possibilità”, di equivoche presenze, di sorprendenti centralità del bambino e de suo mondo. Solamente un ritorno all’origine del pensiero occidentale permette uno sguardo allo stesso tempo ingenuo e profondo verso la contraddizione radicale dell’esistenza umana. In queste ricerca, la figura di un “divino bambino” emerge, riflessa nello specchio, da antiche favole da sempre raccontate. Raccontate ai bambini, sì, per dormire. Ma soprattutto agli adulti, perché possano capire.

This paper focuses on an event that makes us re-think our most important practices: a workshop in a retreat established in Mendham, New Jersey, under the direction of the IAPC (Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children) of Montclair University to facilitate the pedagogical goals of Philosophy for Children (PFC). The aim of this paper is to clarify and reconfigure a personal experience of what happened during those ten days. The sense of the author is that something extremely significant, that touches on the nature of pedagogy, and the fate of philosophy takes place in such a workshop.

This study attempts to describe and analyze the question of teacher formation in Philosophy for Children by focusing on two central principles: the first is that we defend the introduction of philosophy into elementary schools; the second that we place greater emphasis on current programs of teacher formation in the field. We begin the article by analyzing the work and research of the creator and pioneer of the program Philosophy for Children, Matthew Lipman. The article proceeds to inquire into and describe the teacher formation efforts in the field in Brasil, mainly those of the Brasilian Center of Philosophy for Children (CBFC) and some alternative efforts coordinated by Walter Kohan and Paula Ramos de Oliveira. A general overview of teacher formation and the teaching profession in Brasil is also conducted. The theoretical base, from which we analyze the concept of formation, is built on the Frankfurt School, particularly Theodor W. Adorno’s texts on education, formation, and semi-formation.

Philosophy with Children, in all its guises, aims to engender philosophical thinking and reasoning in children. Much is written about what participation in philosophy might do for children academically and emotionally. What is proposed here is that by allowing children to participate in philosophical dialogue they will learn an approach that might support their participation in society. It is inevitable that by living with others one encounters others’ values. It is essential, therefore, that children learn how to deal with others’ values but also that they learn how to develop their own through questioning and reflection. Rather than teach children about values or teach them the values they should hold, this article suggests that children should be afforded opportunities to explore a range of perspectives but that they need to learn how to do this. In addition, though, in order to live harmoniously with others, there are considerations beyond ethics to be encountered. Children need to learn how to engage with politics, art, science, literature, and the wider range of issues that comprise life in a society. Indeed, children need to learn what is required of being a citizen. Here the learning of the child is contextualised in the Scottish Curriculum for Excellence, where children are expected to be able “to make informed choices and decisions” and to “develop informed, ethical views of complex issues” (Scottish Executive, 2004, p.12) as part of their education for citizenship. If being a citizen involves these elements, then there is a challenge to teachers as to how children will achieve the desired outcomes. The aim of such a curriculum is that children learn for life in order that society will be enhanced. It is posited, in this article, that by participating in philosophical dialogue one is likely to foster appreciation for others and their perspectives, that one’s own values and opinions evolve, and that this philosophical outlook may, in fact, work for the betterment of society. Indeed, what is suggested is that in doing philosophy one learns how to live well.

This paper discusses some major similarities and differences between community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) and community of mathematical inquiry (CMI), and offers a few examples of the implementation of CMI in the context of a school mathematics classroom. Three modes of CMI are suggested. The first mode facilitates inquiry into mathematical problems - that is, it provides a medium for “doing and talking mathematics.” In this case, CMI is primarily an avenue for problem solving—defining problems, interpreting them, working with different methods to solve them, reflecting on suggested alternative methods, verifying solutions, and drawing conclusions. The second mode leads us to “talk about mathematics” through collaborative inquiry into mathematical concepts such as axioms, theorems, algorithms, infinity, and the posing of philosophical questions that concern mathematics as a system--particular structures and rules and their relation to human experience. The third mode makes use of CMI for meta-inquiry into our collective experience in “doing and talking mathematics” and “talking about mathematics,” and may be characterized as “talking about doing mathematics.”

J’ai adressé de vives critiques à la pédagogie, en me démarquant de celle-ci, pour lui opposer une notion plus neutre « d’éducation ». En bref : s’il est hors de doute que l’enfance doive être éduquée, il n’est pas nécessaire ni universalisable qu’elle doive être soumise à une pédagogie, à un « dispositif pédagogique ». Je donnais une définition précise et restrictive de la pédagogie : une éducation sous la conduite d’un adulte conduisant l’enfant ( pédagogue). Il faut remarquer, d’ailleurs, que ce mot, dans son usage classique et contemporain n’a plus le même sens que dans l’antiquité grecque. De la notion de pédagogie, je retenais la notion de surveillance ; associée, ensuite, à celle de fonctions spécifiquement éducatives, et de méthodes propres à entraîner l’élève à apprendre de bon gré, à le « capturer » ou à le « capter », à le séduire. Mais, dans l’un et l’autre cas, c’est le même genre de dispositif. Seulement, inversé. Il faut concevoir – c’est ce que dit Deleuze à propos de Foucault—les dispositifs comme des lignes, des vecteurs qui vont susciter et mettre en place, à chaque fois, selon chaque problème, des institutions particulières. Ces lignes ne tracent pas de contours bien définis; elles ne cernent ni n’encerclent, mais elles parcourent, traversent et rassemblent ce qui était autrement organisé ou subsistait à l’état dispersé. Elles font ainsi apparaître une nouvelle configuration. Parmi les contemporains, il me paraît que Pasolini est le seul à avoir vu et exprimé ce qu’est le véritable processus de pédagogisation de l’enfance, qui est, en même temps, processus de subjectivation et indication d’une éventuelle possibilité de retournement de pouvoir; ou, autrement dit, d’une révolution pédagogique permettant à l’ enfant de conquérir cette autonomie qui, sans cesse, lui est promise et toujours refusée. Pasolini a esquissés une nouvelle pragmatique à opposer à toutes les doctrines d’enseignement.

The paper deals with the analysis of the buffer or transitional nature of humanistic-oriented school subjects like “Philosophy for children” first introduced in the USA by Dr. M. Lipman and Dr. Ann Sharp. A new ecopsychological and ecofacilitative vision is suggested. The ecofacilitative approach is assumed to be better fit a) into the framework of the ongoing educational ecocrisis and b) as a resolution of the emergent eurointegration and globalization issues.